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BIWEEKLY BRIEFING         Wednesday/September 26, 2001

 

SHEVARDNADZE'S GEORGIA: FROM THE POLITICS OF BALANCING TO AN ERA OF STAGNATION
Zurab Tchiaberashvili

Many in Georgia and in the West thought that during his last presidential term, Shevardnadze would demonstrate the political will to implement fundamental reforms in different fields of Government and to help the country out of crisis. However, the deepening gorge between the reformist and anti-reformist forces in government are now becoming public and irreconcilable, further worsening Georgia’s already grave internal situation. Voices in the west indicate a risk that Georgia's allies may be losing their patience. While understandable, that could be disastrous, indeed lethal for Georgia's future.

BACKGROUND: The 4 September meeting of the Anti-corruption Council clearly demonstrated that the ‘master of balancing’ is unable to choose between the two opposing camps in the Georgian government. The president told the reformers that they would have to cooperate with the ministers of law-enforcement agencies that the secretary of the Anti-Corruption Council accused of corruption: 'There are not many of you! You can not bring about a revolution!'. Probably catalyzed by this meeting, Shevardnadze under anti-reformist pressure then left the post of chairman of the Citizen’s Union Party, which retains a majority in the parliament. Analysts now expect the party to split into several fractions. Shevardnadze's resignation was followed by the resignation of the high-profile leader of the reformist camp, Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili indicated he did not intend to cooperate with the ministers of law-enforcement agencies he had personally accused of corruption. 'It is immoral to remain in President Shevardnadze's corrupted government', he stated in a televised address.
The reformers’ numbers are indeed small compared to the bulk of state bureaucracy led by Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze and Minister of Economy Ivane Chkhartishvili. But the reformers enjoy public support, as is clear from results of opinion polls and their meetings with people in the regions. With increasing government inability to tackle the country’ problems, demands for real change are increasing. Whereas fresh elections would be the ideal solution to the problem, the risk of serious irregularities limiting the people’s right to elect their government is great. There are reasons to suspect that the Russian scenario may be repeated: Shevardnadze will leave a heir, who will secure the interests of the president’s family.
There are other reasons why waiting until the scheduled 2005 presidential elections may be problematic. The recent murder of a prominent journalist showed that beyond failing to collect taxes and protecting Georgia from Russian attacks, the government is unable to ensure the security of its citizens. With internal stability decaying, the collapse of Georgian state is increasingly talked of; recurring Russian attempts to undermine Georgia are made easier by the Georgian state’s slf-inflicted weakness. Russia is attractive for the corrupt Georgian officials not only because they are rewarded by Moscow for lobbying economic projects harmful to Georgia, but also due to less tangible issues of lifestyle and mentality. The ‘old guard’ fear that if Georgia continues to move towards the west, that will eventually bring to power people who will hold them responsible for their illegally acquired property. Staying within the Russian sphere of influence, on the other hand, would ensure their personal security.

IMPLICATIONS: Shevardnadze’s inability to make a choice between the Targamadze-Chkhartishvili and Zhvania-Saakashvili teams reveals his failure to make a strategic choice. Ironically, keeping Russian military bases in Georgia may be the only way for Shevardnadze to persuade the West of his importance. Without Russian bases, the safe transportation of oil and gas will be ensured and the West would no longer forgive Georgian government the numerous encroachments on democracy that take place today. It is obvious that without Western financial assistance, it will be impossible to maintain the elementary attributes of sovereignty (like a stable currency) in Georgia today. But the often-blind western confidence in Shevardnadze has resulted in a situation where sharp criticism from Washington can impel the Georgian president to move closer to Moscow. At the same time, the west cannot uncritically continue to cooperate with, and fund, the Georgian government.
Such criticism has its local grounds in Georgia. Also small in comparison to the Western money received by Shevardnadze's government, the amounts spent by the West on the development of the civil society and free media in Georgia has also brought some results. NGOs and the media have demonstrated a clear support of Zhvania-Saakashvili team. Maybe that is why the president has been calling for a review of the rights of the media at the legislative level for over a year.
Since Shevardnadze is unable to choose, it's Zhvania-Saakashvili team that faces a tough choice. They are respected by the West, but the West is no longer content with the situation, where Zhvania and Saakashvili can not influence the political processes. Besides, there is a growing feeling in Georgian society that if the reformers can not change anything, they should at least stop playing the role of a nice facade of the corrupt government.
Parliamentary chairman Zhvania has so far been sure to affirm his loyalty to Shevardnadze. His only action up to now has been to write an open letter to the President, expressing concern of the lack of reform and corruption. Being members of the same team, Zhvania and Saakashvili hence pursue different strategies. In the public perception, Zhvania's responses on the criticism aim to keep his own position in the government, while Saakashvili personifies the public's needs and feelings. Unlike Zhvania, Saakashvili has been more active, suggesting various legislative reforms, all of which have met harsh resistance from other cabinet members.
Although Shevardnadze may not care much about the opinion of NGOs, journalists and ordinary citizens, the opinion of the intelligentsia has been important to him ever since he was the leader of the Georgian Communist Party. He remembers very well that discontent among the intelligentsia played a decisive role in overthrowing the former president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The current situation, incidentally, is increasingly resembling the scenario of 10 years ago, when Gamsakhurdia was overthrown and civil war raged in Tbilisi.

CONCLUSION: For the West and for pro-Western forces in Georgia, it would be preferable if the country waited until the 2005 Presidential Elections and then acted, armed with civic consciousness. But already today, events may lead people to the streets at any given time. The almost traditional lack of electricity in winter, or a drastic devaluation of the national currency, increased tension in the Pankisi gorge or a new political murder, may all become triggers for a public upheaval.
Most worrisome is the fact that the alternatives to street politics is hardly encouraging: a Brezhnevite stagnation, with the president unable to make and implement decisions; or a fast, revolutionary development of events with unknown results. A transitional model or mechanism, that would ensure the security of the country and its citizens, cannot be seen yet. In this sense, Georgia may never have needed the west as much as it does today, It would be tragic indeed if the West, as recent analyses have suggested, would lose its patience in this decisive moment.

AUTHOR BIO: Zurab Tchiaberashvili is a NATO Fellow, and Head of the Civil Education Department at the National Parliamentary Library of Georgia.

Copyright 2001 The Analyst. All Rights Reserved.