STOCKHOLM ANKARA BAKU BOSTON DUSHANBE ISLAMABAD
LONDON TASHKENT TBILISI TEHRAN UFA WASHINGTON

In addition to Afghanistan, the countries with the most to gain from the ongoing coalition campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan are the Central Asian Republics. At the same time, however, Central Asia also has the most to lose. This analysis by Tamara Makarenko of the post-11 September environment in the region suggests that the short-term benefits of financial aid and military assistance promised coalition states in exchange for co-operation may not reverse the growing risks of transnational crime, terrorism and internal political unrest.

After 11 September, Central Asia was immediately recognised as a necessary strategic asset for US-led Afghan operations. It thus took little time for Washington to seek cooperation from the Central Asian Republics (CARs) in the counterterrorist coalition. In fact, Central Asian co-operation formed the strategic backbone of early US military operations.

Aware of their geographic importance to the international coalition, most Central Asian governments were willing to enter into negotiations with Washington to discuss how they could help in the counterterrorism efforts. However, fearing either militant reprisals or a backlash from Moscow for overt cooperation with the USA, the leaders of the CARs were initially very careful in how perceptions of their emerging relationship were transmitted nationally and regionally. As reports emerged that Central Asian territory was being used for US-led offensive operations in Afghanistan, Bishkek, Dushanbe and Tashkent regularly asserted that US use of their territory was restricted to organising humanitarian efforts. As the threat of a backlash attack in these states faded, official denial of coalition co-operation also disappeared.

The reality of the agreements reached between Washington and CARs were quite different to those regularly reported in the press. Considering the extent of the international presence in Central Asia today, it is evident that very detailed agreements were finalised in the weeks following the September events. Evidence confirms that, in addition to organising operations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, US forces also covertly used Tajik territory to stage special force operations into Afghanistan.

The pack

Of all the CARs, Uzbekistan has been the most important in terms of US military strategy. Apart from its proximity to Afghanistan, compared with the other CARs, Uzbekistan offers the best military and transport facilities. Thus in exchange for opening its territory to Washington via granting access to the Khanabad airbase, Karimov was given political and economic concessions.

Politically, official criticism of Uzbekistan's human rights record has been downplayed in Washington. On several occasions since 11 September, President George W Bush has indirectly given added legitimacy to Tashkent's repressive crackdowns against 'terrorists' by highlighting the regional dangers posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In Uzbekistan, counterterrorism is regularly used as the primary motivation for repressing any form of political opposition. Economically, immediately after granting Washington access to Khanabad, Tashkent received a US$25m grant from Washington to purchase weapons and military equipment. Over the past six months the USA has promised approximately $160m to Tashkent without any conditions attached.

Following Uzbekistan's lead, Kyrgyzstan became the second Central Asian republic to grant Washington military access to its territory. Over the past six months, coalition forces - led by the USA - have constructed an airbase at Manas Airport. As with Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz airbase is used as a base for both offensive and humanitarian operations. Unlike Tashkent, however, Bishkek has limited the US presence by offering a one-year lease.

The logic behind Kyrgyzstan's co-operation was, and will remain, primarily economic. Since December, the presence of US military forces have injected approximately $14m into the Kyrgyz economy, and it is expected that $40m will be put into the local economy by year's end. Furthermore, it is expected that Washington will grant Bishkek up to $8m for military training and financing over the next two years. Given these economic incentives, it is highly probable that the US military presence in Kyrgyzstan will be extended. Over the past 10 years, enjoying warm relations with Bishkek, Washington is evidently preparing for a long stay - despite indications that the Kyrgyz public are growing weary of such a presence. Billy Montgomery, Brigadier General Christopher Kelly's chief of staff, has noted recently that, "we'll stay here as long as the relationship is good".

Tajikistan, the third republic to offer the US-led coalition access to military bases, continues to remain relatively silent about the extent of the co-operation agreements reached between Dushanbe and Washington. Careful not to offend Moscow - although President Rakhmonov has been asserting his position a lot more aggressively given the presence of the USA in the region - JIR sources have suggested that the USA has primarily used Tajik territory as a staging ground for covert operations. In exchange for their welcome, Washington has pledged $125m to Dushanbe without attached conditions for reform.

The deal

As a result of successful co-operation attained with Central Asian states, Washington has appeared to further reward regional governments by loosening export restrictions on arms sales. Initially restricted in Central Asia because of poor human rights records and weak democratic institutions, the USA reversed its stance in April. This move has been further facilitated by promises of more military aid to the region, and additional financing to be used for the purchase of US weaponry. The focus on the military component of the short-term objectives of counterterrorism operations has thus evidently far outweighed any need for targeting the roots of terror or ensuring long-term regional stability.

Although Washington is careful not to suggest that the USA has long-term interests in Central Asia, its support of authoritarian governments, eagerness to distribute military aid, and build permanent military structures suggests that US forces are preparing for anything but a short-term visit. This view is given credence by a February statement made by Beth Jones, assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, at a press briefing. "The fact is," said Jones, "we are not looking for, we don't want, US bases in Central Asia. We don't want a US base anywhere. But what we do want is access to the bases to which we have access now for as long as we need them." In light of the post-11 September security environment developing in Central Asia, it may be suggested that the USA will have reason to retain a prolonged Central Asian presence.

Evidently, the deals concluded between Washington and the Central Asian governments did not emerge simply because of friendly bilateral relations. On the contrary, most agreements were formulated through diplomatic bartering and/or threats in order for each player to secure their own short-term interests and objectives. For the USA, this meant successfully eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; and for the Central Asian states it meant gaining economic aid with no strings attached.

Counterplay

Since September, the existence of Islamic militants and Islamic extremism in Central Asia has received unprecedented international attention. Ties between the IMU and Osama bin Laden were regularly reported by press and government officials; and, as part of their agreement with Tashkent, Washington placed IMU bases on the list of legitimate targets to be eliminated by US military operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in addition to targeting the IMU as a dangerous group capable of instigating regional instability, international attention has also turned to the growth of other radical extremist groups in the region, such as Hizb-ut Tahrir, as posing an equally dangerous threat to the future stability of Central Asian states.

Although some of these concerns about Islamic extremism in Central Asia may be warranted, much of the attention afforded to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is creating more problems than it solves.

The concerns that do warrant attention surround the operations and organisation of the IMU. Having a proven ability to create instability - as illustrated by their incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 - the IMU has been a legitimate concern for Central Asian governments. However, although IMU bases were targeted during US operations in Afghanistan, and several IMU members - including military commander Juma Namanganiy - were killed, evidence strongly indicates that the IMU has not been eliminated. Reports suggest that groups of IMU militants are scattered throughout Tajikistan and Pakistan, and IMU 'sleepers' and supporters remain in place throughout the CARs.

Following allegations of Namanganiy's death - which were confirmed by JIR sources - analysts and government officials believed that the group would dissipate because it lacked a replacement leader who could muster the same following as Namanganiy. This neglects the fact that the IMU experienced a significant split in its membership approximately a year ago between militants loyal to Namanganiy and those loyal to political leader Tohir Yuldashev. Given that most IMU militants killed in Afghanistan were Namanganiy followers, it is strongly believed that Yuldashev and his supporters remain at large.

The significance of this revelation is extremely important for both the IMU and the region. Under the leadership of Namanganiy, the IMU was primarily interested in securing its position in the regional drugs trade. Namanganiy attracted a proportion of his followers not through espousing Islamic ideals, but by promising a regular wage. It may therefore be suggested that Namanganiy's death ended the criminal interests of the IMU.

An IMU under the leadership of Tohir Yuldashev, on the other hand, would be characterised as a movement with significantly more interest in pursuing political aims. Unlike Namanganiy, Yuldashev appears to be entirely driven by a desire to make Uzbekistan an Islamic state. Of further importance is the fact that Yuldashev was the leader with contacts with other Islamic militant groups - including groups in Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East. Thus despite Yuldashev's lack of charisma, his extreme Islamic idealism, commitment and ties to the international Islamic militant world make the IMU more of long-term threat than it ever was under Namanganiy.

Although a resurgent IMU under Yuldashev may not have the military strength of the IMU that existed prior to 11 September, it does have the characteristics required to engage in terrorist acts. These include a political/religious membership base, the beginnings of a cell-structured network with 'sleepers' waiting to be called throughout Central Asia, and an international support base that could be tapped to avoid becoming caught up in the criminality associated with narcotics trafficking.

The second radical Islamic group receiving widespread attention in Central Asia is Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT). Unlike the IMU, HT advocates the peaceful overthrow of Central Asian governments, and the establishment of a caliphate that extends throughout the Muslim world. Despite advocating peaceful change, the HT has been outlawed in all five CARs. As a result, the group has been forced underground, and has subsequently developed an intricate cell-based membership scattered throughout the region.

Focusing on the need to replace corrupt and authoritarian governments and put an end to deteriorating economic and social conditions, the HT has attracted a membership base that is believed to number in the tens of thousands. Despite repressive measures used by all Central Asian governments to eliminate the HT - Uzbekistan alone has imprisoned between 5,000 and 7,000 members - recruitment continues unabated. Most recently Tashkent has initiated a campaign that is targeting women who are alleged members of HT cells.

The only change facing the HT since September has been the threat of more concentrated government crackdowns throughout the region; indirectly supported by international coalition fears of the existence of radical Islam in general. Despite appearing to operate more carefully over the past few months, the HT continues to distribute propaganda leaflets in the region. The most recent batches of HT literature confiscated focused on propagating anti-Western sentiment, calling out against the presence of US and UK forces in Central Asia.

Despite general agreement among the populations of Central Asia that the elimination of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan was essential for regional security, local discontent is beginning to emerge as a result of the continued Western military presence in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Moreover, there is a growing perception that the USA is prioritising counterterrorism to the detriment of human rights, and that the promotion of democracy is being translated into direct US support of increasingly repressive and authoritarian Central Asian regimes. US and Western rhetorical interest in promoting peace, and economic and political reform in the region, have subsequently been seen as paradoxical. Growing numbers of disaffected Central Asians are thus seeking membership of Islamic opposition groups as the only alternative for invoking change.

Most HT members purportedly join the group because it does not advocate the use of violence. Although the principle of non-violence remains the official line of the group, there are increasing indications that several HT cells and leaders are beginning to entertain the thought of using violent tactics as the only way to initiate political and social change in Central Asia. Prior to September, HT leaders had allegedly met with the IMU on several occasions, and had also sought to acquire financing by seeking involvement in the drugs trade. These efforts at establishing ties, however, appear to have been postponed given the current regional environment.

Apart from the use of violence, the aims and motivations of HT and Yuldashev's IMU are extremely similar. It is therefore possible to envisage both groups fusing together in the near future to form an organisation with the potential to create a formidable opposition movement in Central Asia. The HT's sophisticated cell-structured international network, and the IMU's knowledge of terror tactics and connections to an international network of militant Islamic groups could produce a worst-case scenario for Central Asia in which a radical Islamic terrorist group similar to those operating in the Middle East and South Asia emerges. A group of this nature would feed off continued government repression and a Western military presence, and logically turn Central Asian governments and Western representatives into legitimate targets.

Given the immediate international concern to eliminate Islamic extremism in Eurasia for fear that another Afghanistan will emerge in the future, combined with token criticism from Washington for human rights abuses and insufficient economic and political reform, an environment attracting growing numbers of supporters to extreme Islamic organisations has emerged. This situation is becoming worse with the perception that Washington is supporting these governments for their own interests - either in the name of counter-terrorism, or in the name of maintaining stable regional governments to ensure US access to oil and gas reserves.

The joker

Focused on the threat posed by terrorism and radical Islamism in the region, both Central Asian governments and the international counterterrorism coalition have neglected the role of the drugs trade and organised crime in sustaining instability.

Primarily concerned about destroying Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, the international coalition against terrorism neglected the fact that the drugs mafias would take advantage of the insecurity, and lack of international interest to deter the drugs trade, and promote the growing of opium poppy crops. It was not until various international agency and government reports indicated that Afghanistan was en route to producing a bumper opium harvest that attention was redirected in an attempt to stop opium crops from being harvested. Such measures evidently came too late, and now the most conservative estimates suggest that 230 tonnes of heroin will be produced from Afghan opium over the next year.

The failure to prevent a large opium harvest this year will undoubtedly undermine attempts to promote security in Afghanistan and the CARs. Evidence already indicates that members of the Afghan interim government, and warlords brought into the political process, remain involved in the Afghan drugs trade. It thus remains in their interest to ensure that the largest opium-growing areas of Afghanistan remain strictly under their control. Unconvinced about the future of Afghanistan, these actors depend on the financial security and power provided by the drugs trade.

A similar predicament exists within Central Asia with drug mafias exerting increasing social, economic and political influence. Given the expanding reliance on the 'Northern Route' to transport Afghan opiates throughout the former Soviet Union and Western Europe, Central Asia is highly sensitive to the operations of the drugs trade.

In addition to the social instability created via rising drug addiction and drug-related crimes, political legitimacy is also brought into question due to numerous allegations that high-ranking government officials - in addition to members of the security services and law enforcement - are directly involved in drug mafias.

Central Asian criminal organisations, unfortunately, have not limited their activities to the drugs trade. Many groups are involved in arms trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling in commercial goods - including oil and gas products and consumer durables. Trafficking in weapons is of particular concern to regional security because it necessarily supports the emergence of armed violence. Readily available arms in Central Asia would only exacerbate, and potentially tempt, the emergence of violent political opposition.

As illustrated in past bombings in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, any pressures placed on regional criminal groups by government structures, or competing groups, will likely result in violence. Western interests are therefore faced by a conundrum with respect to organised crime in Central Asia. On the one hand, criminal groups will continue to undermine political and economic stability; and on the other, any drastic change in the political environment will likely provoke a backlash by criminal organisations which have political influence, economic resources, and an interest in maintaining the environment as it currently exists. Ignoring the problem of organised crime, however, will merely allow the problem to grow. Apart from fostering the emergence of 'criminal states', allowing Central Asian organised crime to grow further will ensure that militant groups remain well armed, and that alternative sources of financing continue to exist for those who require it.

Combined with repressive government policies towards opposition movements, incessant corruption and evidence of direct government involvement in criminal activity, and the misallocation and misappropriation of financial and natural resources, political discontent is rising throughout the region. Those frustrated with the political environment subsequently find alternative movements, including radical Islamic organisations, attractive. Apart from joining radical groups, Central Asia is also beginning to experience growing numbers of protests, some of which have ended up in violent clashes between citizens and law- enforcement personnel - such as the March protests in the Aksy region of Kyrgyzstan.

The play

In addition to the threat to regional stability posed by terrorism, the rise of radical Islamic groups, and organised crime, Central Asia is further threatened by the emergence of Uzbekistan as a regional hegemon - facilitated by military aid promised by the USA, and haphazard Afghan development.

An artificially empowered Tashkent will lead to increased tensions between CARs - tensions that have already emerged over the past year as a result of unilateral actions taken by Uzbekistan to secure its borders. Similarly, Afghan development projects that fail to consider implications on Central Asia may also produce regional tensions. For example, attempts to increase agricultural development in the northern provinces of Afghanistan will necessarily require access to water reserves. Considering that Afghan agricultural development will depend on water from the Amu Darya River, water management in Central Asia may face further pressures and thus contribute to regional tensions. Water distribution in the region has already been a cause of regional friction.

These scenarios may be considered the result of ill-defined Western policy in the region, or by-products of a 'new great game'. One of the greatest criticisms that has been levelled against Western policy in Central Asia, especially that of the USA, is that it is not adequately defined. As US forces continue to build themselves into 'semi-permanent' bases on Central Asian territory, questions are being raised internally and regionally about the potential long-term objectives of such a presence. Adamant that its only regional objective is to counter terrorism in Afghanistan, Washington is beginning to raise suspicion by avoiding regional concerns that it is taking advantage of counterterrorist operations to establish a physical presence that could be used as a source of leverage in future negotiations over controlling stakes in oil and gas development projects.

Without addressing these concerns - voiced by Central Asian political opposition, and voices emanating from Russia, China and Iran - statements such as Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's remarks to the New York Times in January 2002 regarding US bases in Central Asia and the Caucasus will continue to drive distrust of US rhetoric. Wolfowitz commented that the function of US bases "may be more political than actual military". The new bases "send a message to everybody, including important countries like Uzbekistan, that we have a capacity to come back in and will come back in".

Questions surrounding the long-term interests of the USA in Central Asia (and the Caucasus) have also been justified in light of Washington's radical shift in Caspian policy. Steven Mann, special adviser for the Caspian to the US Secretary of State, announced during a news conference in March that the USA believed Caspian oil reserves could be freely developed without defining the sea's legal status. Given that Washington has insisted since 1993 that it would be impossible to develop oil reserves without defining the legal status of the Caspian, Mann's comments were considered to be extremely important.

In this light, continued Russian co-operation and acceptance of a US presence in Central Asia may soon be undermined. In fact, it is difficult for the USA to criticise Russian President Putin's April decision to conduct military operations in the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, Washington's failure to coherently address its intentions in Central Asia may potentially drive Moscow and Beijing together, while simultaneously evoking more assertive efforts by Iran and Turkey to counter what may be regarded as expanding US influence.

Tamara Makarenko is a Senior Associate with Cornell Caspian Consulting. She is also JIR's adviser on Systematic Transnational Crime and lectures on criminology at Glamorgan University, UK.