THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A REGIONAL OVERVIEW AND CONFLICT ASSESSMENT
CONFLICT AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Dangers for Future Instability

The overview above illustrates the complexity and interrelated nature of security threats in the South Caucasus. Either individually or in combination, frozen territorial conflicts, dormant ethnic tensions, internal power struggles, foreign meddling, political violence and transnational crime all contribute present and potential threats to the security of the region. This section aims at identifying the most pressing threats to peace and stability in the South Caucasus. Before listing these, however, an overview of the more general factors that aggravate the regional situation is in order.

General Aggravating Factors

The regional situation in the South Caucasus is conflict-prone and inherently unstable as a result of several interrelated factors. Weak state structures breed corruption, incapacitate law enforcement, prevent tax collection, and lessen governments’ legitimacy and control. Socio-economic problems create poverty and frustration and dangers of social reactions against mismanaged governments; a weak political culture prone to nationalism and the personalization of politics breeds fragmentation and the risk of aggressive populism. Exacerbating this situation, regional and great powers regularly take advantage of state weakness to pursue their narrow self-interest in the region; and transnational criminal or subversive groups take advantage of state weakness, corruption and public frustration to operate in the region, increase their control over state structures, and recruit followers.

Weak State Structures

The South Caucasian states are young, carry the heavy burden of a Soviet heritage, and have been unable to reform their bureaucracies to build efficient and functioning institutions that can fulfill normal state functions, such as effective law enforcement over tax collection to the provision of basic social services to the population. Government organs are still run by large and inefficient bureaucracies that hinder economic activity and investment; state organs are run by Soviet-minded bureaucrats that lack training for their jobs and receive extremely low wages (in the order of $30-50 per month) that are grossly insufficient to support their families. As a result, corruption is rampant from primary school teachers to government ministers – a Georgian ministerial salary is ca. $250 per month. The inability of the South Caucasian states to direct a concerted crackdown against corruption will continue to pose the single greatest obstacle to bringing stability in the region. It is the existence of corruption, for example, that fuels major smuggling operations, which subsequently feed violence in the many forms it appears throughout the South Caucasus. At a political level, power rests in personalities, not in institutions. Armenia and Azerbaijan enjoy some stability and governments can be said to control their territories – with the exception of the occupied territories in Azerbaijan. However, this is mainly due to the personal authority of Heydar Aliyev, his ability to keep the government and state organs together and therefore keep the state functioning. This authority and order may not be transferred easily into the post-Aliyev era. As the Elçibey era’s end in 1993 showed, centrifugal tendencies exist in the country, as both ethnically and regionally based potentates may be waiting to challenge the government’s authority and maximize their autonomy, threatening to fragment the country. This process is already present in Georgia, in spite of Shevardnadze’s stabilizing influence. Both Shevardnadze and Aliyev ruled their respective republics for over two decades in the Soviet era, and therefore maintained networks and authority that they used to stabilize their war-ridden countries in the mid-1990s. Yet Shevardnadze’s government is considerably weaker than Aliyev’s. Besides the secessionist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, his government has practically no control over the areas of Javakheti, Ajaria, and Pankisi, whereas government authority barely exists in parts of Svaneti and Mingrelia. Given the fragmented nature of Georgian politics, the risk of further loss of central government influence and control is high in the post-Shevardnadze era. The process of institution-building is still in a preliminary phase in the three republics. Unless this process is advanced and developed, the Caucasus will remain prone to corruption and mismanagement, which in turn will continue to restrict economic growth and enable criminal structures to gain influence.

Dire Socio-Economic Conditions

The South Caucasian states saw dramatic plunges in socio-economic indicators in the 1990s. Economic production declined by over 50%, communications were cut in many instances, and the entire economic pattern collapsed. From having been relatively well-off parts of the Soviet Union (especially Armenia and Georgia), the South Caucasus already in the late 1980s saw a drastic decline in economic production. Armenia’s production level of 1992 was less than 40% of the level in 1985. By 1995, Georgia’s GDP had dropped to ca. 20% of the 1990 level, and to 40% in Azerbaijan. This unparalleled economic recession brought poverty and misery to large numbers of people, and over half of the population of the region are classified as living under the poverty line. This situation has created significant frustration with the performance of governments, with corruption in government circles and with the rapidly growing income differentials. The situation is worst in Georgia, where much of the country has simply been left without electricity during winter months. These hardships create a frustrated and disillusioned population, that is currently showing clear indications of political apathy. The risk of apathy turning into violent protest at any given time is already evident – as illustrated in the demonstrations in Georgia, especially in the winter of 2001. Moreover, dire conditions also increase the possibility of extremist ideologies gaining ground among the population, or of masses spontaneously supporting militant anti-government movements – as the case was in Iran in the late 1970s, when most political factions supported the revolution. Religious extremism has increased in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and has most publicly revealed itself in Georgian religious extremists’ attacks on non-traditional religious minorities.

Political Culture

With a past in the former Soviet Union’s totalitarian system, the Caucasian states’ experience of participatory politics, free speech, and civil society is only a decade old. The Soviet experience fueled a political culture already marked by authoritarian traditions, implying that with the exception of a two-year period in 1918-21, the Caucasus never experienced a political system that could be classified as anything close to liberal or participatory. The ‘Soviet mentality’ is a major problem that impedes these countries’ development, as civil servant are not trained or inclined to serve the people but to serve and please higher officials. In the judicial system, law enforcement still sticks to old patterns of extracting confessions under duress rather than finding evidence; and local election commissioners are likely to falsify elections in favor of whoever is in power, whether the latter desire it or not. The population at large has little belief in their ability to influence their leadership. The term ‘democracy’ has come to be associated with everything negative in the past decade, and surveys show that people value free speech and liberties less than the order and economic wealth they associate with authoritarian rule. The principles of democratic rule are hence not yet firmly engrained in the Caucasian societies, and this in turn increases the appeal of non-democratic and non-tolerant ideologies. Nationalism conquered the Caucasus in the late 1990s; while nationalist euphoria has decreased since then, the wars have strengthened mutual prejudice and thwarted efforts at conciliation. Even among ethnic groups that have preserved peace, suspicion often remains strong – a marked increase in anti-Armenian sentiment has been witnessed in Georgia, for example. Likewise, radical religious ideologies have gained ground in this atmosphere.

Great Power Meddling

The political balance within and between the three Caucasian states and societies is already fragile; however, the weakness of these states has required them to seek foreign patronage and support, while the attractiveness of the region has itself led to a high level of great power interest, as described above. Political processes within the three states therefore typically take place in relation to the interests of and relationships with foreign powers. Especially in the unavoidable processes of political succession, the influence of foreign power is likely to be significant. Pretenders to the leadership of both Georgia and Azerbaijan have found exile in Moscow and Tehran, and are widely expected to stage a return in a succession crisis. In particular, it is feared that the succession to President Aliyev in Azerbaijan will lead to overt or covert Turkish, American, Iranian, and Russian meddling, with unknown consequences. In Georgia, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is likely to strongly influence the succession to Shevardnadze that is to take place in 2005. Hence political parties and leaders in the Caucasus remain watchful of their relations with Moscow, Washington or Ankara, in the hope that such relations would give them an advantage in domestic political struggles.

Combined with the wobbling and uncertain policies of the great powers, this increases the instability and unpredictability of Caucasian political processes. The profile of the region has risen in the early 2000s, not only in Europe and the United States, but also throughout East and South Asia, and interaction with these regions continues to grow, increasing the role of regional and international politics in the affairs of the Caucasus. The region is no longer an isolated backwater as it was between 1990-93; it is at a crossroads of the interests of powerful external interests. Concretely, an increasing factor of insecurity stems from U.S. attempts to assert itself without careful consideration of the implications its actions in the region may have in the medium to long-term. This is especially true if Washington is developing its South Caucasian strategy on short-term interests, and if the U.S. is perceived as utilizing its regional inroads to secure economic interests on the back of security rhetoric.

Narcotics and Terrorism

In a situation of persisting economic and political instability in the region, combined with the inability of South Caucasian governments to gain control over all their territory, transnational crime is likely to remain a considerable threat well into the future. Criminal networks have successfully found allies in state institutions, thus ensuring their security from any menial attempts to crackdown on criminality. Given rising opium production in Afghanistan, the South Caucasus will continue (and likely to increasingly) be used as a major trafficking route. Neither of the three states have the capability or political will to control the illicit drugs trade, unwilling as they are to face the potential reprisals associated with targeting relatively powerful actors. As far as the arms trade is concerned, there will remain great demand for weapons and ammunition until the secessionist conflicts are resolved and the influence of criminal actors is significantly eliminated. The threat of transnational crime capturing state organs is evident by Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge experience, where reliable indications suggest that transnational criminal groups were practically renting the area from the former leadership of the ministries of interior and national security for large sums of money. The situation has improved with the new leadership in these ministries since November 2001, yet the consequences of transnational crime networks utilizing high-level corruption is apparent. International influence may prove capable of preventing this type of collusion in the future. However, during periods of instability, for example in the event of a protracted succession struggle or revival of ethnic conflicts, it is conceivable that criminal or terrorist networks in search for a base of operations will seek to find a haven in the South Caucasus – especially given the strategic location of the region.

Specific Sources of Concern

The main threats to peace and stability in the South Caucasus are identified below, listed in a rough order of their likelihood and the scale of their implications.

Risk of new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia

The unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the largest threat to peace and security in the South Caucasus and perhaps in the wider region. With every year that the deadlocked conflict continues without a solution, the risk of a resumption of hostilities looms larger, with ever larger implications. At present, the current political elites in both Armenia and Azerbaijan seem inclined to find a solution by peaceful means. While Armenia has suffered considerably in both economic and demographic terms as a result of the conflict, its current leadership refuses to compromise on Mountainous Karabakh’s independence. This is the case in part due to the dominance of a Karabakh elite in Armenian politics: President Kocharian is the former President of the unrecognized republic, and defense minister Sarkisian is its former defense minister. This elite seems to give at least equal emphasis to Karabakh’s interests compared to those of Armenia, unlike former President Ter-Petrossian, who concluded by 1997 that Armenia’s interests required a compromise on the status of Karabakh. The Armenian leadership currently controls the territory of Mountainous Karabakh and adjacent Azerbaijani regions, and therefore feels less urgency in a solution. Armenia is clearly interested in preserving the military status quo until it can get a favorable deal. The Azerbaijani society and leadership, on the other hand, is deeply disturbed by the humiliation of losing almost a fifth of the country’s territory, and the massive refugee and IDP population is both an economic drain and a political concern. Both Azerbaijan’s Communist regime and the Elçibey government fell in great part due to their failures in the war, and President Aliyev is aware that the same fate may await if not him, then possibly his son Ilham if he comes to power. Moreover, popular frustration in the country is on the rise with what is perceived as Armenian intransigence and international disregard to the aggression committed against their country. President Aliyev’s control seems to be the major reason that spontaneous revanchist movements, including paramilitary ones, are not emerging, especially among the refugee population.

The failure of negotiations has worsened matters. When President Ter-Petrossian accepted the 1997 Minsk Group proposal, hundreds of thousands of IDPs rejoiced at the prospect of an imminent return home. In late 1999, an imminent deal was shelved after the October 27 tragedy in the Armenian parliament, while great hopes were again dashed in the Spring of 2001. The opposition and large tracts of the Azerbaijani public seems to have concluded that a military solution is the only remaining option to restore the country’s territorial integrity and enable refugees to return to their homes. The Aliyev government, which has earlier ruled out the military option, is now increasingly stressing that the Azerbaijani army is ready to liberate its territory if negotiations fail. If the present deadlock continues, the public and elite mood in Azerbaijan will continue to gradually tilt towards war. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is recovering economically, and will begin to receive substantial oil revenues within a few years. It is also building its armed forces with Turkish assistance – and Armenia’s population is shrinking. Azerbaijan may hence feel the odds are in its favor.

A new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unlikely to remain as limited as the previous one was. In 1992-94, the two states had only rudimentary weaponry, and the military forces involved were far from professional. But in the last eight years, both states have acquired more sophisticated and therefore more deadly arms, meaning that a new war would almost certainly cause much larger human and material destruction. Perhaps even more alarming is the network of alliances that both states have built. Armenia and Russia have strong military ties, and even joint military units, while Turkey has basically built the Azerbaijani military and provides advisers. Neither Turkey nor Russia is hence likely to remain on the sidelines of a new confrontation. Fighting is also likely to take place close to the Iranian border, therefore possibly drawing Iran into the conflict as well. Pakistan has also offered Azerbaijan military assistance. Great power involvement may help prevent a new war, but would give it regional implications of a massive scale if it were to occur.

Several possible scenarios could lead to a new war. The most likely is after a change of leadership in Azerbaijan, especially if it occurs after the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is completed in 2005 and Azerbaijan has thereby cemented its role in energy markets. Should a representative of the nationalist opposition come to power, its tougher stance on the Karabakh issue will increase the risk of conflict, as the new government is likely to seriously consider the war option to liberate occupied territories. If a member of the current regime takes over power, including Ilham Aliyev, the new government’s popular legitimacy will be extremely low. Under such conditions, it may see a successful military operation in Karabakh as the easiest and quickest way to gain popular support. This scenario is reminiscent of the Russian example, where President Putin’s ascent to power was effectively built on the resumption of the war in Chechnya. A third scenario, which could occur in conjunction with any of the two above, is if a conflict between Armenia and Georgia over Javakheti erupts, distracting Armenia’s attention and providing Azerbaijan with a ‘golden opportunity’ to reconquer Karabakh. (see below) The fallout of a renewed war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, obviously, would be disastrous for the South Caucasus. As mentioned above, the likelihood of this actually taking place is rising as negotiations do not inspire hope for a solution; but regional powers also have a great deal of influence on the two parties, hence their stances and actions could play an important role in either preventing or permitting a war to occur.

Risk of armed conflict in Javakheti

The tense situation in Javakheti is the most delicate minority situation in the South Caucasus today. Several triggering factors could destabilize the situation in Javakheti and lead to unrest and armed conflict, and the regional implications of such a conflict are large and possibly devastating. Triggering factors that could spark a conflict in Javakheti are the possible withdrawal of the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki; the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks; clan struggles in the region; and increased nationalist activity of ethnic Armenian political movements.

At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia agreed to withdraw military bases from Georgia. Javakheti Armenians, however, are for both economic and political reasons closer to the Armenian than Georgian government in their favorable attitude to Russia and Russian military presence in the region. They feel that the Russian military presence helped alleviate their traditional fear of Turkey. Moreover, Russia’s influence balances the nationalizing efforts of the Georgian state. No less important, the Russian base is the main provider of jobs, money, health care, and revenues from smuggling in an economically devastated region. About 70% of the people employed on the base are local Armenians, often Russian passport-holders, and the cash contribution of the Russian base to the region probably exceeds the local budget. There is a widespread belief among residents of the Akhalkalaki region that the Russian military base is the only factor that keeps the economy of this isolated region afloat. All of this has contributed to fears that the withdrawal of the Russian bases will lead both Russian and Armenian nationalist groups to try to exploit the concerns of the local population against the interests of regional stability.

Increased activity of the Virk political party could also rise tensions in the region. The party has been denied registration with the Ministry of Justice, and accuses the government of oppressing the rights of ethnic minorities. Virk and another Armenian political party, Javakhk, are advocating greater rights for the ethnic Armenian community, rising concerns about a potential Turkish threat to the local Armenian population, and strongly opposing a Russian military withdrawal. They continue to drive a local debate on Javakheti’s status within Georgia, calling for regional autonomy. Javakhk has a radical faction tied to the Armenian nationalist movement Dashnaktsutiun, which is a leading force in the Armenian Diaspora. The Dashnaktsutiun party, which is allied with Armenian President Kocharyan, supports Javakheti’s unification with Armenia. Armenian Diaspora groups have also increasingly advocated autonomy for Javakheti. Competition between clans, who share control of the trade route to Armenia and the fuel business, could also be destabilizing, as Javakheti is one of the most heavily armed regions of Georgia. Another crucial triggering factor is the expected repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks. As a condition for membership in the Council of Europe in 1999, Georgia agreed that the Meskhetians, deported in 1944, would be allowed to repatriate within 12 years to their homes in the Meskheti region adjacent to Javakheti. There is strong opposition to their return among both the Georgian and the Armenian population of the region. Competition for scarce land, water, and employment would be exacerbated by their return.

Stability or instability in Javakheti is largely dependent on Russian and Armenian policies towards Georgia. Whereas the Armenian government has been careful to exert a calming influence on Javakheti in the past decade due to Armenia’s dependence on Georgia for trade and access to the world, territorial ambitions on Georgia exist among influential sectors of the Armenian political sphere. Moreover, Russian hard-line policies could easily set fire to Javakheti. The regional implication of such a conflict  are large. If a conflict erupts between Armenian groups and Georgian authorities in Javakheti, it will be extremely difficult for the Armenian leadership to remain neutral in this conflict. Strong domestic pressures are likely to be exerted on the Armenian leadership to protect Armenians in Javakheti and to secure the detachment of the region from Georgia. There is hence an obvious risk that conflict in Javakheti would lead to a confrontation between Armenia and Georgia; as noted above, this would disrupt the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, creating a temptation for Baku to attempt to evict Armenian occupation forces from its territories. It is not too far-fetched to assume Azerbaijan and Georgia would make common cause in such an event, leading to a full-blown South Caucasian war in which several regional powers including Turkey, Russia, the United States and Iran could be implicated. While this is a worst-case scenario, it illustrates the crucial role that Javakheti plays in the security of the South Caucasus and the imperative of keeping the fragile stability there and working to prevent a conflict in the region.

Risk of resumption of hostilities in Abkhazia

The conflict in Abkhazia has the same symbolic importance for Georgia as Mountainous Karabakh has for Azerbaijan. Similarities abound, including a humiliating defeat against a much smaller enemy supported by external powers; ethnic cleansing and the creation of a large IDP population; a mutiny during the war that threatened collapse of the state; and protracted negotiations that yield no results. But unlike in Karabakh, unrest has returned to Abkhazia several times since the end of large-scale hostilities. Firstly, Georgian paramilitary forces issued from the IDP population have been carrying on a low-intensity conflict along the border regions of Abkhazia and Samegrelo for several years. But more importantly, a brief return to warfare occurred in May 1998, which forced ca. 30,000 Georgians that had returned to their homes in Abkhazia’s Gali region to flee again. Then as now, the Abkhazian side relied heavily on Russian peacekeeping troops that have been considerably closer to the Abkhaz de facto authorities than to the Georgian side. In the Fall of 2001, unrest again erupted in Abkhazia, when Georgian paramilitaries, in apparent conjunction with several hundred Chechen irregulars belonging to Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev’s forces, entered Abkhazia from the Kodori gorge bordering on Svaneti. This irregular force managed to make a deep dent into the Abkhaz defenses before Russian air force jets bombed their positions and forced them to retreat. The Georgian government denied any knowledge of the events, however high echelons of power were undoubtedly informed. The episode spurred debate in Georgia on whether a reconquest of Abkhazia was possible. In March 2002, Georgian guerrillas took four CIS peacekeeping troops hostage, overtly offending Moscow.

The Georgian regular army is presently in no condition to stage a military operation in Abkhazia. However, the size differential is so large that even a small but reasonably well-trained and disciplined Georgian force could alter the balance heavily in Georgia’s favor. The U.S. decision to send a train and equip assistance program consisting of lose to 200 American soldiers and a US$64 million grant is going to create exactly that. While the U.S. intends to create a Georgian force that can restore order in the Pankisi gorge, Abkhazian concern centers around the future potential of Georgian troops using their training and newly acquired equipment in renewed attempts to reconquer separatist territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Indeed, given current political turmoil in Georgia, it is not far-fetched to assume a future leadership would want to use its newly acquired military force to restore its territorial integrity, especially given the strong influence of the IDP lobby in politics.

Risk of succession struggles degenerating into civil conflict

Succession has for several years been a key word in the Caucasus. As mentioned above, the personal roles of Presidents Shevardnadze and Aliyev in ensuring stability in their respective countries is understood as being so central that their passing or demise would risk to bring instability and, in the worst-case scenario, civil unrest and conflict. The advanced age of the two Presidents – Aliev is 80 years old and Shevardnadze 75 – entails that the succession crisis is likely to be nearer in time than for any of the Central Asian countries. A succession crisis may emerge in Armenia as well, if President Kocharyan is impeached or is removed from the political scene. However, the likelihood that Armenia would be hit by protracted instability or large-scale unrest is comparatively low.

Shevardnadze’s decision to refrain from extending his stay in power after 2005 has both made the succession in Georgia more predictable, but also more acute. Analysts suggest that a sudden, unexpected succession could spark open conflict among elites. As Shevardnadze has (unlike Aliyev) not indicated a heir apparent, uncertainty about who would next hold the vast power of the Presidency creates strong incentives for contenders to use force as part of their efforts. If Shevardnadze is not successful in tapping a successor who is acceptable to other power brokers, tensions will rise as 2005 approaches or his health deteriorates. Like Yeltsin who named Putin as his heir apparent, Shevardnadze has incentives to ensure his close circle will remain under the wing of the new president. Therefore, his designee will not be a reformer, like former parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania, who was earlier groomed as an heir. The heir could be among the business magnates, who publicly support all of president’s deeds, and are seeking to legitimize their property. Shevardnadze could also reckon on the New Rights political party of young nouveau riches, who are trying to control not only business, but political structures as well. Their circle includes Badri Patarkatsishvili, media magnate and partner of Russian mogul Boris Berezovski, who is wanted in Russia. Shevardnadze has sheltered Patarkatsishvili, hoping that would help him maintain a tight grasp on political power. The clique of notorious Vano Chkartishvili, former Minister of Economics and trade and Kakha Targamadze, the ousted Minister of Internal affairs, is also part of the same grouping. This movement is thought to be willing to promise security to the President’s clan. In all probability, economic interests opposed to a reformist successor have had enough time to join forces to take preemptive action, and are ready to nominate a future President. Such a clique could easily use force to secure their interests, possibly leading to civil unrest if the reformers manage to coalesce significant amounts of people against these structures. Whether the U.S. or Russia will get involved in the succession struggle, especially if it becomes violent, is another factor that will influence its outcome.

In the case of Azerbaijan, President Aliyev’s health problems and obvious attempts to groom his son Ilham for the Presidency have led to a perception of urgency and uncertainty regarding the inevitable succession. Aliyev has announced his intention to run for re-election in 2003, and seems fully capable of continuing to rule in the near term, and perhaps even to win a fair election unless the opposition manages to unite around one strong candidate, presently a distant prospect. However, incipient divisions within the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, as well as power struggle among opposition parties raises the distinct possibility for instability, violence and even a civil war following Aliyev’s inevitable exit, whether planned or unplanned, from the political scene.

Ilham Aliyev is a top official with the state oil company SOCAR and was appointed head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) in 2001. Several political alliances have allegedly begun to back candidates largely based on territorial orientations. This trend is worrisome because the emergence of strong regional affiliations in the politics of former Soviet republics has commonly been associated with protracted struggles. Two alleged realignments within the ruling party have attracted attention. The first group, known as the 91st Group, is comprised of founding members including the former Press and Media Minister Siruz Tebrizli and the former Mayor of Baku, Rafael Allakhverdiev. This alliance seems directed against Ramiz Mekhtiyev, head of the Presidential administration and a potential obstacle to Ilham’s succession as president. The second faction is allegedly supported by Mehtiev, thus explaining the potential threat that he poses to President Aliyev’s dynastic plans. Interested in avoiding a succession crisis that could breed political in-fighting or outright civil war, Aliyev appears determined to organize a clear political heir that will enjoy significant governmental support. However, the vocal opposition is unlikely to accept a dynastic succession but will press for the implementation of democratic reforms with western assistance in the post-Aliyev era. Moreover, exiled figures such as Ayaz Mutalibov, who spent a decade in Moscow, and Mahir Javadov in Iran, may seek to return with support from these foreign powers; speculation also abounds that Aliyev is seeking to secure Moscow’s support (as well as Washington’s, with lesser success) for his son Ilham. The ability and willingness of the U.S. or Turkey to influence the succession struggle is also unclear. A possible scenario is that an entrenched and weak successor to Aliyev may be beleaguered by parts of the former ruling elite (as the ruling party is unlikely to stay united after Aliyev’s demise), the democratic opposition, and possibly Islamic forces, with foreign powers playing subversive roles. The rivalry between the two camps, if protracted, could then lead to discord within law enforcement agencies and the army, and in the worst case scenario a civil unrest and bloodshed.

Another factor that could aggravate the situation in both countries would be a lack of attention on the part of international organizations. Their role in ensuring that the transition of power is smooth, peaceful and democratic is great. By building democratic governance and insisting on the conduct of fair and free elections as well as the development of civil society institutions, international organizations can help ensure political stability in the South Caucasus. If they do not, the risk of violent succession struggles will be high.

Risk of Russian intervention under alleged terrorism framework

For the last three years, Moscow has accused Tbilisi of allowing Chechen guerrillas to use the Pankisi gorge for training and logistics, as well as a base from which to move into Chechnya, and has therefore exerted continuous pressure on Georgia to crack down on the movements of Chechen separatists. Since September 11, Georgia has also come under US pressure to curb lawlessness in Pankisi. The presence of Chechen fighters in Georgia undermines the country's security, and Russian officials have utilized the Pankisi situation to damage Georgia’s international image, and to gain leverage over Tbilisi in negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian forces from the country. Russian media reports in February 2002 that al Qaeda fighters, possibly including Osama bin Laden himself, found refuge in Georgia were stoking pressure for outside military intervention. The Russian Defense Minister declared that Moscow might feel compelled to intervene militarily to contain Islamic radicals in Georgia, and other Russian officials have asserted Russia’s "moral right" to launch an antiterrorist operation in Pankisi. The American military assistance program that was speedily announced in February may have been designed to forestall a Russian military move against Georgia. In spite of this, President Putin has insisted that the Pankisi problem could be solved only with Russian military participation. Clashes near the Georgian border in late July 2002 led to Russian rocket strikes on Georgian territory, indicating that the problem may escalate at any point.

Risk of strengthening of Islamic radicalism

The risk of a strengthening of Islamic radicalism at a level threatening regional security or the national security of either Georgia or Azerbaijan seems relatively low at present. However, the proximity of the war in Chechnya and disillusionment with the ideologies of democracy and market economy are factors that ensure that this risk is clear and present.   The second war in Chechnya, raging since 1999, has led to a marked increase of Islamic radicalism not only among the Chechens but among neighboring republics of the North Caucasus, including Dagestan. Arab missionaries preach the Salafi version of Islam and are gaining a growing popularity among people whose lives have been ravaged by war and economic despair. By 2000-2001, this process had begun to affect the South Caucasus as well. The Sunni north of Azerbaijan has become an area of Salafi influence, whereas both the Pankisi gorge of Georgia and other, not traditionally Muslim parts of mountainous northern Georgia are also affected. As long as the genocidal war in Chechnya is continuing, the injustices and massive human rights violations it has engendered are likely to fan the flames of Islamic radicalism both among the directly affected population in Chechnya and in its wider neighborhood.

Secondly, the rise of Islamic radicalism in Azerbaijan was able to develop not primarily because of the support it has received from Iran, but because of widespread disappointment among the general public with the current regime and the existing ideology. People have lost faith both in communism and market economy, and the vacuum created increases the appeal of Islam, with its notions of equality, brotherhood and fairness. This could potentially serve as an aggravating factor in the democratic development of the country. In the short term, the rise of Islamic radicalism is likely to remain manageable. However, in case of continued poverty, authoritarian rule and growing income disparities, Islamic radicalism may prove to gradually gain ground in Azerbaijan.

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